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The Trouble with the Curve: Manufacturer and
Surgeon Liability for “Learning Curves”
Associated with Unreliably-Screened
Implantable Medical Devices
Frank Griffin, M.D., J.D. *

I. INTRODUCTION
Implantable medical devices have a considerable
effect on the health and finances of Americans. The
United States consumes about half of the worldwide
market for implantable medical devices. 1 Every year,
surgeons perform approximately seven million procedures
implanting devices from eye lenses to hip replacements,
with each procedure ranging in price from $800 to
$45,000. 2 Publicly traded device manufacturers alone
generate nearly $200 billion in revenue per year, with most
of the revenue being produced by just thirty companies. 3
The rate of success of the implantation of the medical
device depends upon device design and physician
experience. New devices are often associated with an
increased rate of complications during the first few years
the device is on the market as doctors learn how to better
implant the device and as device companies make

*

The author thanks Professor Rob Leflar, Professor Amanda Hurst, Michael
Goswami, and Micah Goodwin for their feedback and assistance with this article. The
author is an orthopedic surgeon.
1. INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 173 (2011) [hereinafter IOM REPORT],
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13150/medical-devices-and-the-publics-health-the-fda510k-clearance [https://perma.cc/78VZ-UX7B].
2. Douglas A. McIntyre, The Eleven Most Implanted Medical Devices in
America, 24/7 WALL ST. (July 18, 2011), http://247wallst.com/healthcareeconomy/2011/07/18/the-eleven-most-implanted-medical-devices-in-america/print/
[https://perma.cc/FWC8-RM5D].
3. Id.; see also IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 169-70 (noting revenues of
almost $190 billion in 2008).

756

TROUBLE WITH THE CURVE

[Vol. 69:755

modifications to the device. 4 On a graph depicting
complication rates of devices, a distinct elevation can be
seen during this initial phase as the device is being
introduced for public use. This phenomenon is known as
the “learning curve” 5 and is shown for a hypothetical
implant in Figure 1. 6

4. See, e.g., Aaron J. Johnson et al., Is There a New Learning Curve with
Transition to a New Resurfacing System?, 69 BULL. N.Y.U. HOSP. JOINT DISEASES
S16, S16 (2011) (noting a “substantial learning curve” when surgeons first
switched to hip resurfacing implants from other procedures); Brahmajee K.
Nallamothu et al., Operator Experience and Carotid Stenting Outcomes in
Medicare Beneficiaries, 306 JAMA 1338, 1342 (2011) (finding higher mortality
rates associated with early operator experience); Mikko Peltola et al., Learning
Curve for New Technology? A Nationwide Register-Based Study of 46,363 Total
Knee Arthroplasties, 95 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 2097, 2102 (2013) (finding a
learning curve effect and early revision risks in knee implants, and further
suggesting that the manufacturers consider the learning effect when designing
new implants); Aartik Sarma, The Learning Curve for Medical Devices: Experience
with Vascular Closure Devices in Massachusetts, 61 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOL. 10_S
(2013) (finding the rate and magnitude of the learning curve differed between two
different vascular closure devices); Kesavapillai Subramonian, Acquiring Surgical
Skills: A Comparative Study of Open Versus Laparoscopic Surgery, 45 EUR.
UROLOGY 346 (2004) (finding differences in the learning curve for open versus
laparoscopic surgery).
5. See Brian Aros et al., Is a Sliding Hip Screw or IM Nail the Preferred
Implant for Intertrochanteric Fracture Fixation?, 466 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS &
RELATED RES. 2827, 2830 (2008).
6. The learning curve is defined as “[t]he time taken and/or the number of
procedures an average surgeon needs to be able to perform a procedure
independently with a reasonable outcome.” K. Subramonian & G. Muir, The
‘Learning Curve’ in Surgery: What Is It, How Do We Measure It and Can We
Influence It?, 93 BJU INT’L 1173, 1173 (2004).
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For medical devices, the learning curve refers to
the early period of device adoption when the device
company and surgeons are developing the knowledge
needed to implant the device reliably in a manner that
minimizes the risk of harm to the patient. 7 Many medical
devices exhibit learning curves associated with serious
complications—including death in some cases. 8
During the learning curve period, the complication
rate for the new device is often higher than for the
established device being replaced. 9 In those instances,
patients suffer unnecessary complications because the
doctor could have used the established device to avoid the

added risk. Figure 2 10 demonstrates this scenario where
the older device is much safer during the learning curve
period:

7. See id.
8. Nallamothu et al., supra note 4, at 1342.
9. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
10. See Subramonian & Muir, supra note 6, at 1174 (“The slope of a learning
curve depends on the nature of the procedure. It has been postulated that the
learning curve for minimally invasive procedures is longer than that for open
surgical procedures.”).
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For the hypothetical implant in Figure 2, note that the
complication rate was higher for the new device from 1998
through 2005. 11 The expertise of subspecialty surgeons,
who were early adopters of the new device, may have
elicited lower complication rates for the first couple of
years (1998-1999 in Fig. 2). This was followed by higher
complication rates as the more average surgeons adopted
the device (2000-2001 in Fig. 2). 12 In some cases, a new
device may be so broadly adopted that it becomes the
standard of care at the peak of the learning curve even
though its complication rate is substantially higher than the
replaced device. This is likely due to a rush by surgeons
to adopt the latest and greatest technology. 13 Finally in
2006, in the hypothetical implant example depicted in
Figure 2, after surgeon self-education and implant
company modifications to the new device, the
complication rate for the new device eventually equaled
that of the established device. 14 In reality, after the
learning curve is complete, the complication rate for the
new device could remain higher than, equal to, or, ideally,
lower than the established device.

11. See Subramonian & Muir, supra notes 6, 9 and accompanying text.
12. See id.
13. Jeffrey O. Anglen & James N. Weinstein, Nail or Plate Fixation of
Intertrochanteric Hip Fractures: Changing Pattern of Practice: A Review of the
American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery Database, 90 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY
AM. 700, 706 (2008).
14. See supra Figure 2.
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One device that demonstrated a substantial
learning curve was a special type of intramedullary nail
(Nail) used to treat hip fractures. Around 1997, the Nail
began to replace an older device known as the
compression hip screw (Screw). 15 Figure 3 depicts the
Nail’s learning curve for the bone fractures resulting from
complications 16 (e.g., an additional fracture that occurred
during or after the device was implanted to treat a broken
hip) and is taken from an article comparing the results of
the Nail to the Screw. 17

Figure 3 18

For a copy of the graph, please contact the Managing Editor of the Arkansas
Law Review at arkansaslawreview@gmail.com.

(Reprinted with permission of The Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery)

15. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 705.
16. Id. at 704.
17. Id.
18. Jeffrey O. Anglen & James N. Weinstein, Nail or Plate Fixation of
Intertrochanteric Hip Fractures: Changing Pattern of Practice: A Review of the
American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery Database, 90 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM.,
no. 4. 700, 704 (2008). Graph reprinted with permission.
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The bars on the right of each pair demonstrate the rate of
bone fracture for the Nail, and the bars on the left of each
pair demonstrate the rate of bone fracture for the Screw. 19
From 1999 through 2004, the Nail had a substantially
higher risk of causing bone fracture than the Screw,
forming a clear learning curve similar to that depicted in
Figure 2. 20 Finally in 2005, the risk of bone fracture with
the Nail was similar to the risk associated with the
Screw. 21
When the results of the two devices are compared,
implantation of the Nail placed patients at an increased
risk of bone fracture from 1999 through 2005, which
coincides with the learning curve for the Nail. 22 Several of
those patients suffered unnecessary bone fracture—a
serious injury. 23 Given the thirty-eight percent death rate
among elderly patients with such bone fractures (i.e.,
femur fractures) and that the average age of the
Nail/Screw patients was 77.9, 24 it is likely some patients
died due to the Nail’s learning curve. 25 In addition, the
financial costs associated with adoption of the Nail were
likely significant considering that hip fractures of the type
treated with the Nail and the Screw are a “major source of
morbidity and financial burden” in the United States. 26
Risk-utility balancing can be used to determine
whether or not the manufacturer (or surgeon) acted
negligently by releasing (or using) the device with a
learning curve. 27 For a risk to be acceptable, there must
be enough benefit associated with the device to more than

19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 704.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 704-05.
24. Philipp N. Streubel et al., Mortality After Distal Femur Fractures in Elderly
Patients, 469 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 1188, 1190 (2011). The
thirty-eight percent death rate is at a maximum follow up of 9.8 years. Id.
25. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 705.
26. Eric Swart et al., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Fixation Options for
Intertrochanteric Hip Fractures, 96 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM. 1612, 1612
(2014) (stating hip fractures account for seven percent of osteoporotic fractures
and approximately $6 billion annually).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
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offset the risks of the learning curve. 28 In the case of the
Nail, recent studies have failed to demonstrate any clear
benefit to individual patients, or to society as a whole,
when the Nail replaced the Screw for the vast majority of
hip fracture patients. 29 In fact, a research committee
within the American Board of Orthopedic Surgeons
(ABOS) concluded that “the consensus from the
orthopaedic literature is that . . . nail fixation is associated
with a higher complication rate and no better outcomes”30
when directly compared to the Screw, noting that the Nail
was associated with “higher implant costs and surgeon
fees.”31
It is inherently unreasonable for patients to be
subjected to a learning curve for a device that promises
worse and more expensive outcomes than an established
device. Under simple risk-benefit analysis for both the
individual patient and society as a whole, where an
unreliably-screened,
implantable,
medical
device
(USIMD) 32 offers no proven benefit, no additional risk over

28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f.
29. Swart et al., supra note 24, at 1618.
30. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 705.
31. Id. at 706.
32. For the purposes of this paper, an unreliably-screened, implantable,
medical device (USIMD) is one that reached the market without undergoing
reliable premarket screening of safety and effectiveness by the FDA. In 2011, the
Institute of Medicine concluded that the FDA’s 510(k) screening process (which
uses “substantial equivalence” as the standard for clearance) “lacks the legal basis
to be a reliable premarket screen of the safety and effectiveness of moderate-risk
devices.” IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. Therefore, for purposes of this paper,
the phrase “unreliably-screened” applies to any device cleared through the 510(k)
process or any other FDA path using “substantial equivalence” as the standard.
USIMDs for this article are specifically limited to those that are susceptible to state
law defective design claims because their FDA approval is based upon substantial
equivalency, and thus, are not subject to federal pre-emption afforded Class III
devices approved through the Premarket Approval (PMA) process of the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976. See Gregory J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully,
Express Preemption and Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device
Amendments, 59 Food & Drug L.J. 245, 246-55 (2004) (explaining common law
claims were not expressly preempted “when the device was cleared under the
[less stringent section 501(k)] process.”). But see Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig.
Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 930, 933 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding state law claims alleging
defective design of devices cleared by federal PMA process are preempted by
Medical Device Amendment). “The § 510(k) notification process is by no means
comparable to the PMA process . . . . [T]he § 510(k) review is completed in an
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an established device should be accepted. Patients
injured during the learning curve for a USIMD have at
least two potential routes to recovery under current law:
(1) defective design under products liability law, and (2)
informed consent doctrine under medical malpractice
law. 33

II. PRODUCT LIABILITY: DEFECTIVE DESIGN 34
A learning curve for a USIMD 35 associated with
significant patient injury is prima facie evidence of a
defective design because the risks of the learning curve
are not offset by any proven benefit. 36 This results from
the fact the USIMD “lacks the legal basis” of any “reliable
premarket screen of its safety and effectiveness.” 37 The
World Health Organization (WHO) noted that a slow
learning curve resulting in poor performance is indicative
of a poorly-designed device. 38 Federal law does not
preempt state-law defective design claims against
manufacturers of USIMDs. 39
A plaintiff that can demonstrate the presence of a
learning curve for a USIMD has a prima facie case for
defective design, and the burden shifts to the device
manufacturer to prove that the USIMD’s benefits outweigh

average of only 20 hours” whereas “1200 hours [is] necessary to complete a PMA
review.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1996).
33. See Theodore R. LeBlang, Informed Consent and Disclosure in the
Physician-Patient Relationship: Expanding Obligations for Physicians in the United
States, 14 MED. & L. 429, 429-30 (1995) (noting that a doctor’s duty to inform a
patient of material information in regards to medical care and treatment is
heightened where innovative techniques or research activities are involved); see
also Mary Beth Neraas, Medical Device Preemption After Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 619, 623 (1996) (noting that defective design claim could be
brought for devices cleared under 510(k) process).
34. This section addresses state tort law, not FDA standards.
35. See supra note 30.
36. See Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 71 (1st Cir.
2002).
37. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
38. WORLD HEALTH ORG., MEDICAL DEVICES: MANAGING THE MISMATCH:
INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND CONSEQUENCES FOR
TRAINING AND OUTCOME OF CARE 7 (2010) [hereinafter WHO PAPER],
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2010/WHO_ HSS_EHT_DIM_10.4_eng.pdf.
39. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 492-94 (holding that devices cleared through §
510(k) process are subject to state suit for defective design).
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its risks. 40 Absent such proof, the injured plaintiff should
prevail in a lawsuit against the manufacturer of a USIMD
with a learning curve. A failure-to-warn claim is likely to be
unsuccessful for plaintiffs against device manufacturers
due to the affirmative defense in some jurisdictions
provided by the Learned Intermediary Doctrine—except in
cases where the device manufacturer failed to properly
warn the surgeon. 41

A. “Learning Curve” as a Prima Facie Case of
Defective Design
By definition, a product is “defective in design when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe.”42
Many states hold the seller liable for products using the
“unreasonably dangerous” standard in contrast to the “not
reasonably safe” standard. 43

1. Foreseeable Risks
The risks associated with a USIMD’s learning curve
are foreseeable where the medical literature documents

40. Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (shifting burden
to defendant to prove device was not defective based on risk-benefit theory); see
supra note 33-34 and accompanying text.
41. See Phelps v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 299-303 (7th Cir.
1987) (applying the learned intermediary doctrine to medical devices and stating
that the doctor has the duty to warn patient—not the device manufacturer); see
also Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that
the manufacturer does not have a duty to warn the patient after adequately
notifying the physician of risks).
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1998) (emphasis added).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(“Unreasonably dangerous” is defined as “dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.”); see Voss
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that the “not
reasonably safe” standard is the test to be applied in defective design cases); see
also Horst v. Deere & Co., 752 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (applying the
“unreasonably dangerous” standard to products liability law).
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numerous implants with learning curves, 44 where the
device manufacturer is an expert in the field with
knowledge of such medical literature, 45 and/or where the
experts writing the literature are often agents of the device
companies. 46 The risks must be foreseeable for a product
to be defective such that “[o]nce the plaintiff establishes
that the product was put to a reasonably foreseeable use,
physical risks of injury are generally known or reasonably
knowable by experts in the field. It is not unfair to charge
a manufacturer with knowledge of such generally known
or knowable risks.” 47
Medical device manufacturers are required to be as
knowledgeable as experts in the field for which they create
devices. 48 The expert surgeons and scientists who author
medical literature acknowledging the presence of learning
curves are often paid consultants for the manufacturer of
the USIMDs. 49 Therefore, as agents of their principal
manufacturer, their knowledge can be properly imputed to
the device manufacturer. 50

2. Reasonable Alternative Design
A product is defective if the risk of harm could have
been reduced by adopting a reasonable alternative design

44. See supra note 4.
45. Huggins v. Stryker Corp., 932 F. Supp. 2d 972, 987-88 (D. Minn. 2013).
46. See id. at 987-990; see also Mustafa H. Kahn et al., The Surgeon as a
Consultant for Medical Device Manufacturers: What Do Our Patients Think?, 32
SPINE 2616, 2617 (2007) (discussing the role of orthopedic surgeons as
consultants for device manufacturers).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST.
1998) (emphasis added).
48. See Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 215, 222
(1923) (“The general rule is that a principal is charged with the knowledge of the
agent acquired by the agent in the course of the principal’s business.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 271 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 1998); A. G. S., Annotation, Duty
of Manufacturer or Seller to Warn of Latent Dangers Incident to Article as a Class,
as Distinguished from Duty with Respect to Defects in Particular Article, 86 A.L.R.
947, 949 (1933).
49. See Kahn et al., supra note 44, at 2616-17.
50. See, e.g., Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co., 262 U.S. at 224 (finding that
knowledge was still imputed to the principal despite adverse interests between
agent and principal).
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and “the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.”51 The established device
with the lower complication rate that forms the floor of a
USIMD’s learning curve (Figure 2) is an obvious
reasonable alternative design since it is used for the same
type of injury with a lower baseline complication rate. 52
Therefore, the Screw is a reasonable alternative design to
the Nail. 53
The risk-utility test will always find the established
device a more favorable alternative regardless of whether
it considers risk-utility from the standpoint of the individual
patient at risk of direct harm of the USIMD or the
standpoint of society who will be responsible for the
expenses resulting from USIMD complications. The
USIMD by definition has no proven safety and
effectiveness benefit over the established device and,
therefore, the established device will be considered the
reasonable, alternative design wherever risk-utility
balancing is required. 54
Some states explicitly require proof of a
reasonable, alternative design, while others do not. 55
Whether a state requires the reasonable, alternative
design may depend upon how it applies risk utility
balancing principles. Some states use the “Consumer

51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b).
52. See Genie Indus., Inc. v. Matak, 462 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2015); see also
supra Figure 2.
53. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 705; Swart et al., supra note 24, at
1618.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
55. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(1) (2016) (codifying the
requirement of plaintiff to prove “[t]here existed an alternative design for the
product that was capable of preventing the claimant’s damage”); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1189 (Ala. 1985) (requiring that reasonable
alternative design be shown); Nacci v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 325 A.2d 617, 620
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (requiring a reasonable alternative design). But see French
v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that the requirement
of a reasonable alternative design is not necessary under Arkansas law); Lee v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Okla. 1984) (stating that the
ordinary consumer expectations of unreasonably dangerous be used instead of
proof of a reasonable alternative design).
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Expectations Test”56 which requires that the device sold
“must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer.” 57 In a
USIMD case, a jury could find that the ordinary consumer
would reasonably expect the medical device to be reliably
screened for safety and efficacy. 58 An ordinary consumer
might also reasonably expect that the device would not be
marketed to supplant an established device where there is
knowledge of a harmful learning curve and no reliable
evidence that the USIMD is superior to the established
device. Therefore, in any jurisdiction, the reasonable
alternative design requirement should be easily met when
the USIMD with a proven learning curve is being used in
place of an established device.

3. Not Reasonably Safe
USIMDs with learning curves are not reasonably
safe where they expose patients to increased risks of
harm without any proven benefit to offset that risk. 59 To
be defective, the jury must determine that the USIMD is
not reasonably safe. 60 The language for this requirement
varies between states and includes phrases like “not
reasonably safe,” “unreasonably dangerous” or “fails to
meet reasonable consumer expectations.” 61
The
reasonable, alternative design concept typically becomes
relevant in proving whether a device is not reasonably
56. Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations:
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 861, 901 (1983).
57. Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 1978).
“[T]he injured plaintiff must prove the product is dangerous and that it was
unreasonable for such a danger to exist. Proof of unreasonableness involves a
balancing process. On one side of the scale is the utility of the product and on the
other is the risk of its use.” Id. at 835. See also Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert,
542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) (noting that “the cost and feasibility of eliminating
or minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case”).
58. See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Products Liability in Connection
with Prosthesis or Other Product Designed to be Surgically Implanted in Patient’s
Body, 1 A.L.R.4th 921 (1980) (citing Hopkins v. Dow Corning, Corp., 33 F.3d 1116
(9th Cir. 1994)).
59. Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 398 (Pa. 2014).
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
61. Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102(7)(A) (West 2006).
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safe where many states require proof that it was
technologically (and in some states, economically) feasible
to produce the product in a safer manner. 62 In cases
where a USIMD replaces an established device, the
established device already proves both technologic and
economic feasibility.
Reasonableness with regard to negligence claims
is often evaluated by using risk-utility balancing where the
risks and benefits are compared, as memorialized by
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co. 63 Professor John Wade has identified seven factors
that have been used by many jurisdictions in performing
risk-utility evaluations. 64 Risk-utility balancing with Wade’s
factors makes it apparent that USIMDs’ learning curves
are not reasonably safe because Wade’s factors reveal
the lack of adequate benefit to offset the associated risks.
This is true both for the individual patient and for society
as a whole.
First, a USMID with a proven learning curve fails to
satisfy the test of Wade’s first factor, “usefulness and
desirability of the product—its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.” 65 “Utility to the individual user”

62. See Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y.1983). The
court imposed the requirement of a reasonable alternative design stating that “[t]he
plaintiff, of course, is under an obligation to present evidence that the product, as
designed, was not reasonably safe because there was substantial likelihood of
harm and it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner.” Id. at 208.
63. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
64. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
MISS. L.J. 825, 837–38 (1973). Professor Wade’s factors have been adopted by
many jurisdictions. See, e.g., LaBelle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 508,
515 n.4 (D.S.C. 2001); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879–80 (Ariz.
1985); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 184 n.10 (Colo. 1992); Potter v.
Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1330 n.10 (Conn. 1997); Tabieros v.
Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1309 (Haw. 1997); Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp.,
475 A.2d 1243, 1251-52 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Nunnally v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 869 So. 2d 373, 379–80 (Miss. 2004); Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co.,
660 S.W.2d 404, 411–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Johansen v. Makita U.S.A., Inc.,
607 A.2d 637, 642–43 (N.J. 1992); Duran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779, 784
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 128–29 (Or. 1974);
Phatak v. United Chair Co., 756 A.2d 690, 694 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
65. Wade, supra note 62, at 837.
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requires a proven benefit over an established device, 66
and utility to the public as a whole requires either a lower
cost or another benefit to society. 67 A USIMD offers no
proven benefit, only theoretical advantages that have often
failed to pan out with prior generations of comparable
USIMDs. 68 In fact, USIMDs are often found to be worse
than the device they replaced resulting in harm to the
patient at a more expensive price. 69 Where a device
produces equal or worse outcomes for the individual
patient and is more expensive to the payer system in
terms of cost of the individual cases plus complications—
there is simply no benefit to offset the risks of the learning
curve. Therefore, the first factor heavily favors declaring
these USIMDs not reasonably safe.
Second, USIMDs with learning curves fail to pass
Wade’s second test which involves assessment of the
“safety aspects of the product,” including the likelihood of
resulting injury and the seriousness of any injury because
USIMD injuries are often serious and occur without
underlying reliable safety testing. 70 Significant patient
injuries are often associated with USIMD learning
curves. 71 Complications from implantable medical device
procedures may be serious causing further surgeries,
disability, and/or death. The company’s decision to forego
reliable safety and effectiveness screening results in a
lack of information upon which to base reliable benefit
assessments of the USIMD. Instead, safety and efficacy
testing is basically completed during the learning curve
period
which
is
perilously
close
to
human
experimentation—and is, at an absolute minimum,

66. See Shetterly v. Crown Controls Corp., 719 F. Supp. 385, 399 (W.D. Pa.
1989) (noting the utility to the individual user, from the use of the pallet trucks, as
increased productivity and monetary savings).
67. See id. (noting the utility to the public as lower grocery prices).
68. Marc J. Nieuwenhuijse et al., Appraisal of Evidence Base for Introduction
of New Implants in Hip and Knee Replacement: A Systematic Review of Five
Widely Used Device Technologies, 349 BMJ g5133, at 5 (2014) (finding “no
clinically relevant improved benefits for these devices compared with older and
established alternative implants”); see also Swart et al., supra note 24, at 1613.
69. Nieuwenhuijse et al., supra note 67.
70. Wade, supra note 62, at 837.
71. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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unreasonable where patients’ lives and livelihoods are
placed at risk unnecessarily due to the learning curve.
Wade’s third factor is the “availability of a substitute
product” to meet the “same need and not be as unsafe.” 72
USIMDs with learning curves will fail the third factor. The
majority of USIMDs are released with a goal of replacing
some other device that is already serving the same need
and has a proven track record. 73 If the proven track
record of the established device is poor or if there is no
established device, then the hurdle for the USIMD is low. 74
But if the established device has a satisfactory track
record, the USIMD should offer some type of benefit
before subjecting patients to the increased risks. For
learning curve USIMDs that replace an established device,
unless the USIMD has evidence to support that it is safer
than the established device, analysis of USIMDs using
Wade’s third factor also leads to the conclusion that use of
the USIMD is not reasonably safe.
USIMDs with learning curves also fail Wade’s fourth
factor, which evaluates whether the manufacturer can
eliminate the device’s unsafe character without making it
too expensive to maintain its utility. 75 The manufacturer
has a duty to determine whether or not the device has an
unsafe character. 76 A manufacturer cannot assess the
expenses involved in eliminating learning curve risks
unless reliable premarket screening is first performed to
identify those risks. Further, where no utility or benefit
over an established device has been scientifically proven,

72. Wade, supra note 62, at 837.
73. See Nieuwenhuijse et al., supra note 67 (finding that several recently
introduced devices were not safer nor were they more effective than established
devices).
74. See, e.g., Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1053 (3d Cir. 1997);
Sansom v. Crown Equip. Corp., 880 F. Supp. 2d 648, 663 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
75. Wade, supra note 62, at 837.
76. Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp, 33 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 1994). The
court found that punitive damages were justified where the manufacturer, in a rush
to develop and market implants, “failed to adequately test the implants” and
ignored knowledge of adverse health consequences associated with implants
where “no research concerning the long-term health effects [of product] had been
conducted.” Id. at 1119. Furthermore, the manufacturer “knew long-term studies
of implants’ safety were needed . . . .” Id. at 1127.
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there is no utility to maintain since the user can simply use
the established device instead.
Wade’s fifth factor—“the user’s ability to avoid
danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product”—
may or may not be met depending upon whether the user
referred to by Wade is the surgeon or the patient. 77 If the
user is the surgeon, then the USIMD fails this factor
because the surgeon is unlikely to be able to circumvent
the learning curve since the learning curve phenomenon
occurs in spite of the surgeon’s extensive training and
care in implanting a new USIMD. 78 An argument may be
made that USIMDs are “unavoidably unsafe” products, 79
but this argument fails where an established device
already has a safe track record since the danger can be
avoided simply by using the established device instead.
If the user is the patient, the patient should be
informed of the learning curve in order to have the
opportunity to avoid the danger. The manufacturer may
claim that it has no duty to inform the patient under the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine and that it is up to the
surgeon to obtain informed consent. 80 To eliminate the
manufacturer’s duty to the patient, the manufacturer must
properly inform the learned intermediary (surgeon) that the
USIMD has not been reliably tested for safety and
efficacy. 81 Arguably, the manufacturer may also be
required to inform the surgeon that the USIMD has not
been proven to be superior to the established device, or at
least, not mislead the surgeon into believing otherwise. 82
Once the surgeon is properly informed by the
manufacturer, the surgeon then has a duty under the
Informed Consent Doctrine to properly apprise the patient
77. Wade, supra note 62, at 837.
78. Phelps v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1987)
(debating whether surgeon should be considered a user of medical device); see
also Cutshall v. Photo Medic Equip., Inc., No. CIV.A.1:CV98-297, 2000 WL
1028548, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2000) (stating that Wade’s fifth factor refers to
the user as the ordinary consumer).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
80. See infra Section II.C.
81. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 26 (1998).
82. See id. at 34-35; Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922
(8th Cir. 1970).
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of the risks so that the patient can make an informed
decision about his or her own health care when choosing
between the unproven promise of the USIMD and the
established device. 83 Where the implant company has
failed to notify the surgeon of the USIMD’s approval path
and lack of safety and efficacy testing, such knowledge
cannot be imputed to the surgeon where the surgeon is
not an expert in implant design and the approval
process—so the responsibility still lies with the
manufacturer. 84 Without disclosure, the surgeon may not
have the opportunity to properly inform the patient and
avoid the danger of the learning curve where the
manufacturer’s marketing materials promote advantages
that the surgeon may reasonably assume have a solid
scientific basis. Likewise, the surgeon and patient may
have reasonably assumed that safety and efficacy testing
are a part of the approval process.
Wade’s sixth factor is “[t]he user’s anticipated
awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of
suitable warnings or instructions.”85 USIMDs with learning
curves fail Wade’s sixth factor because there is little public
knowledge of the learning curve and its associated
dangers for new USIMDs. Presumably much of the public
(including physicians) assumes safety and efficacy testing
is a required part of the approval process by the FDA.
However, it is unlikely that the public or physicians are
generally aware of shortcuts such as the “substantial
equivalence” test. 86

83. See Kowalski v. Rose Drugs of Dardanelle, Inc., 2011 Ark. 44, at 17, 378
S.W.3d 109, 120 (stating physicians are in the best position to inform patients of
risks of treatment).
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 1998).
85. Wade, supra note 62, at 837.
86. See Nicholas Bakalar, Medical Procedures May Be Useless, or Worse,
N.Y.
TIMES:
W ELL
(July
26,
2013,
2:30
PM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/medical-procedures-may-be-useless-orworse [https://perma.cc/3U7R-FEKV] (“We usually assume that new medical
procedures and drugs are adopted because they are better.”).
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Wade’s final factor is “[t]he feasibility, on the part of
the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the
price of the product or carrying liability insurance.”87 The
medical device industry is very profitable making it feasible
for the manufacturer to carry liability insurance. Where a
small percentage of users suffer unnecessary
complications during the learning curve period of a
theoretically advantageous new USIMD, it is not
unreasonable to require the device manufacturer to
spread the loss sustained by those individuals to all users
of the device and to the manufacturer themselves by
either purchasing liability insurance or by self-insuring.
The device manufacturer can eliminate its liability by
conducting reliable safety and efficacy testing or by
undergoing the Premarket Approval process, which may
result in federal preemption. 88
Thus, Wade’s risk-utility analysis clarifies that a USIMD
with a learning curve is not reasonably safe if it causes
significant patient injuries.

B. Burden Shift: The Device Manufacturer Should Be
Required to Prove Benefit Once the Plaintiff
Establishes “Learning Curve” Risks
After proving a USIMD is associated with a learning
curve, a plaintiff will have made a prima facie case of
defective design because the plaintiff will have shown
foreseeability of risk, reasonable alternative design, and a
presumptive risk-utility balance that supports a finding of
lack of reasonable safety. 89 If the patient can demonstrate
with expert testimony that his or her physician was on the
learning curve, then the burden shifts to the device
manufacturer to demonstrate benefits to offset the risks
associated with the learning curve because the
manufacturer has the means and the motivation to prove
that its devices are beneficial, if such proof can be found. 90
87. Wade, supra note 62, at 838.
88. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2) (2012); see Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 477, 503 (1996).
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
90. See Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978).
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It is unreasonable to require a plaintiff to prove
Defectiveness by scientific standards where the
manufacturer has never shown Effectiveness. Once the
manufacturer has presented its case for benefit versus the
plaintiff’s case for risk, the question becomes one of fact
for the jury to consider in light of risk-utility balancing
considerations.
The manufacturer is in the best position to prove
the benefits of its implants. The USIMD manufacturer has
access to: the means to manufacture and alter the device;
the designing surgeons who are implanting and evaluating
the device; and patient follow-up information during the
product development period. This makes it feasible for the
company to monitor the outcomes of early patients and
encourage their affiliated surgeons to produce research
proving safety, efficacy, and beneficial use. Research will
benefit the company’s financial bottom line if it can prove
that a device is effective. The company can then market
those findings to other surgeons. Thus, the device
manufacturer has the means and the motivating factors to
provide proof of beneficial use and effectiveness, if such
proof exists. If reliable established devices are available
and the company cannot prove beneficial use of the
USIMD, then no learning curve risk should be tolerated
based on simple risk-to-benefit analysis.
Conversely, a plaintiff patient—with access only to
clinical studies outside information available from the
manufacturer through discovery—would not be able to
produce reliable scientific studies proving defectiveness.
The plaintiff is unlikely to have the means to secure expert
testimony adverse to wealthy manufacturers from implant
designers who hope to continue to work in this $200 billion
per year industry. 91 This generally leaves hired guns as
the only feasible alternatives to testify on behalf of the
plaintiff, 92 and at a very high financial cost and limited

91. See IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 169-70; see also McIntyre, supra note
2.
92. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How
Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1126-30
(1997).
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credibility under Daubert standards. 93 From a practical
standpoint for the plaintiff, the barriers imposed by
Daubert are usually insurmountable for learning curve
USIMDs due to the costs involved and the limited ability of
anyone outside the industry to produce such devices and
test them in patient care circumstances.
Therefore, the plaintiff should only be required to
put forth Daubert-level evidence proving that the risks
outweigh the benefits, if the device manufacturer can
scientifically prove sufficient benefit.
If the device
manufacturer is unable to prove any benefit over an
established device that is safe, then the plaintiff should
prevail when he/she was injured during a learning curve.

C. Other Design Defect Considerations: Failure to
Warn and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Device manufacturers may be liable for defective
design for failure to warn of the harms associated with the
learning curve for USIMDs, but the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine’s affirmative defense makes this approach
difficult for the plaintiff.
[A product] is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable
instructions or warnings by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial
chain of distribution, and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not
reasonably safe. 94

However, in some states, the device manufacturer
may assert an affirmative defense under the Learned
93. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert
places limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence by applying a reliability
standard that requires that testimony be grounded in scientific methods and
procedures. Id. at 592-93. The judge is to consider whether the theory can be
tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, whether it
has a known error rate, whether standards control its operation and whether it is
widely accepted in the scientific community. Id. at 593-94. The focus is on the
principles and methodology. Id. at 595.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
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Intermediary Doctrine that it reasonably relied upon the
physician to convey relevant warnings to the patient. 95 In
the vast majority of medical implant cases, the device
manufacturer has no direct contact with the plaintiff prior to
the surgical procedure, and imposing a duty on the
manufacturer to intervene in the doctor-patient relationship
is generally disfavored. 96
Therefore, the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine would apply to most medical device
cases.
On the other hand, the plaintiff may still have an
argument for failure to warn because the device
manufacturer has a duty to warn the surgeon of the
product’s dangerous propensities and may have failed to
do so. 97 To assert the Learned Intermediary defense as a
shield against liability, the device company for the USIMD
must provide adequate warnings to the prescribing
surgeon. 98 Some courts have ruled that the patient is
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of proximate
causation where the manufacturer failed to adequately
warn the learned intermediary. 99 Also, if the salespeople
working for the manufacturer are guilty of over-promotion,
the warning may be deemed inadequate. 100 Norms within
the medical profession may make surgeons susceptible to
an overreliance on misleading information leading to a
belief that they are engaging in sound medical practice
95. See Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying
Arkansas law); Kane, supra note 80, at 73-74 (1998 & Supp. 2016) (noting that
courts in fourteen states allowed the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to relieve the
manufacturer of the duty to warn the patient directly).
96. West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 42, 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (1991);
Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 138, 155 (Haw. 1995); see Kane, supra note 80, at 7377 (1998 & Supp. 2016).
97. See Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 42 (Ill. 2002).
98. Breen v. Synthes-Stratec, Inc., 947 A.2d 383, 387 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008);
McNichols v. Johnson & Johnson, 461 F. Supp. 2d 736, 739 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (noting
that under Illinois law, the learned intermediary doctrine is a shield against liability
only where the manufacturer of a prescription drug has given adequate warning of
known dangerous propensities of the drug to physicians); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
99. Mampe v. Ayerst Labs., 548 A.2d 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Miller v.
Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1126 (D. Kan. 2002); Woulfe v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
965 F. Supp. 1478, 1483 (E.D. Okla. 1997).
100. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1973); Hamilton
v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1109 (Colo. App. 1976); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d
206, 219 (Pa. 1971).
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where medical device manufacturers influence surgeons
in ways similar to pharmaceutical firms. 101
Device
manufacturers generally do not disclose to surgeons that
USIMDs reached the market using “unreliable screening,”
and many surgeons assume otherwise. 102
Physicians who have limited experience using a
new device are not in the best position to recognize the
presence of a learning curve because the subtle
differences between implants are not always readily
apparent. A device manufacturer that properly introduces
and monitors a new medical device is in a much better
position to recognize the presence of a learning curve,
while a single surgeon has only his or her own experience
to draw from. Thus, it would be proper to hold the
manufacturer liable for failure to warn the surgeon of any
learning curve risks.

III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INFORMED
CONSENT
A violation of the standard of reasonable conduct 103
under the Informed Consent Doctrine occurs when a
surgeon fails to inform a preoperative patient of his or her
learning curve with a particular USIMD. 104 The learning
curve risks of some USIMDs are within the required scope
of disclosure of material facts to the patient for informed
consent as a matter of public policy. In addition, the
Affordable Care Act’s “preference sensitive care”
101. Marc A. Rodwin, Institutional Corruption and the Pharmaceutical Policy,
41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 544, 548-49 (2013).
102. From my 20 years working as an orthopaedic surgeon, I do not recall
any device company representative ever disclosing that a device was cleared via a
“substantial equivalence” pathway, and I generally assumed that available devices
on the open market had undergone testing with scientific rigor similar to publication
standards in our industry—minimum of 2 years clinical follow-up with rigorous
clinical evaluation.
Likewise, I have heard other surgeons make similar
assumptions throughout my career.
103. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 356
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (“In other words, ‘duty’ is a question of
whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular
plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is always the same—to conform to the
legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.”).
104. See Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease
Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 370 (1975).
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provisions may provide an added layer of obligation to
disclose the learning curve for elective procedures. 105

A. Public Policy
Physicians have a fundamental duty to warn
patients of the risks and consequences of a medical
procedure under the Informed Consent Doctrine. 106 Under
the doctrine, the patient’s right to participate in the
decision-making process regarding his or her personal
health is regarded as one of the patient’s “most
fundamental rights.” 107 Informed consent is important for
many reasons, including preservation of personal
autonomy and the right of self-determination. 108 It fosters
communication between doctor and patient, encouraging
doctors to be careful in decision-making while
simultaneously fostering rational decision-making by the
patient and involving the public in medical decisionmaking. 109 Patient outcomes may improve if patients are
assisted in making informed decisions about their own
By participating in and
treatments and illnesses. 110
understanding the process, patients can also improve
quality of care by giving feedback to the healthcare
system. 111 Some doctors feel that physician inexperience
is not part of the informed consent equation. 112 The idea
that a physician may not disclose his or her inexperience
to the patient in order to gain experience to help future
patients has been described as the “physician’s dodge”
with one author saying, “[l]earning must be stolen, taken
as a kind of bodily eminent domain.” 113
105. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 936, 42 U.S.C. § 299b36(b)(2), (d)(1)(A) (2012).
106. Lucas v. Awaad, 830 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
107. Yves Longtin et al., Patient Participation: Current Knowledge and
Applicability to Patient Safety, 85 MAYO CLINICAL PROC. 53, 54 (2010).
108. Capron, supra note 104, at 365.
109. Id. at 365-76.
110. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LAW AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY, PATIENT
SAFETY, AND MEDICAL LIABILITY 185 (7th ed. 2013).
111. Longtin et al., supra note 107, at 53.
112. Ashley H. Wiltbank, Note, Informed Consent and Physician
Inexperience: A Prescription for Liability?, 42 W ILLAMETTE L. REV. 563, 573 (2006).
113. ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT
SCIENCE 32 (2002).
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Failure to inform the patient of a USIMD’s learning
curve deprives the patient and the system of all of the
benefits of informed consent doctrine. First, the patient’s
fundamental rights of self-determination and personal
autonomy are violated where the surgeon is allowed to
choose a riskier USIMD over an established device
without disclosing the risks involved with the learning
curve, and allowing the patient to participate in the choice.
Second, failure to reveal the learning curve to the patient
deprives the patient of the opportunity to make a rational
choice between competing devices. Third, an opportunity
is missed to personalize the learning curve by
encouraging the surgeon to reflect upon the
consequences of the learning curve upon the individual
patient. Finally, from a public policy standpoint, failure to
inform the patient leaves the patient uneducated and
unable to provide necessary feedback during the learning
curve period for USIMDs. Informing the patient of the
learning curve allows the patient to participate more
vociferously during this phase of device implementation.
Thus, an opportunity to gain a patient’s assistance in the
assessment of quality of care is missed if the patient is
uninformed.

B. Scope of Disclosure
The scope of information that should be disclosed
under the Informed Consent Doctrine clearly includes the
risks associated with a learning curve where the courts
have required that surgeons inform patients of material
risks, alternative treatment options, and risks of death or
serious injury. 114 Whether the physician had a duty to
warn of dangers associated with particular circumstances
is generally a question to be submitted to the jury. 115

114. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
115. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1960).
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Many courts adopt a rule that any material risk must
be disclosed. 116 “A material risk is a risk which a
reasonable person would consider significant in deciding
whether to undergo a particular medical treatment.” 117
The risks of a learning curve for a USIMD are often
material risks. 118
A reasonable person would likely
consider a learning curve significant in his or her decision
to undergo surgery with a USIMD if that learning curve
increases significantly the risk of the procedure over an
established device. For example, at least one court has
considered failure of a surgeon to disclose his
inexperience with a particular procedure as admissible
evidence for the jury to consider in an informed consent
evaluation. 119 Where the risk involves serious injury like a
bone fracture for the Nail used in the case illustration
discussed earlier, a reasonable person would probably
consider that information significant in making the
decision.
Many courts require the surgeon disclose
reasonable alternative treatment options. 120 A reasonable
116. See, e.g., Hill v. Medlantic Health Care Grp., 933 A.2d 314, 329-30
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000);
Hahn v. Mirda, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (Ct. App. 2007); DeGennaro v. Tandon,
873 A.2d 191, 196 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 118
F. Supp. 2d 73, 81 (D. Mass. 2000).
117. Hill, 933 A.2d at 330.
118. P. Healey & J. Samanta, When Does the ‘Learning Curve’ of Innovative
Interventions Become Questionable Practice?, 36 EUR. J. VASCULAR &
ENDOVASCULAR SURGERY 253, 256 (2008).
119. Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1255 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding “a
number of courts have concluded physician-specific information such as
experience is relevant to the informed consent issue and physicians have a duty to
voluntarily disclose such information prior to obtaining a patient’s consent”);
Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1170, 1172 (Del. 1997) (noting that failure to
disclose that physician had not recently performed aneurism surgery and there
were other nearby hospitals that specialized in aneurism surgery were important
considerations for informed consent); Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545
N.W.2d 495, 506 (Wis. 1996) (“[T]he defendant was not unduly or unfairly
prejudiced by the admission of evidence reflecting his failure to disclose his limited
prior experience in operating on basilar bifurcation aneurysms.”).
120. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., 895 P.2d 484, 493 (Alaska 1995); Miller
v. Van Newkirk, 628 P.2d 143, 146 (Colo. App. 1980); Ray ex rel. Ray v. Kapiolani
Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d 569, 581 (Haw. 2011); Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp.,
88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958); Stanley v. Chevathanarat, 664 S.E.2d 146, 149
(W. Va. 2008).
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rule is that “where a physician or surgeon can ascertain in
advance of an operation, alternative situations and no
immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed
of the alternative possibilities and given a chance to
decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation.”121
Where an established device has a proven track record
and the new USIMD has merely hypothetical projections,
the established device would be the reasonable,
alternative treatment option.
In any jurisdiction that
requires disclosure of a reasonable, alternative treatment
option under the Informed Consent Doctrine, the fact that
the established device is available as a reasonable
alternative and has not been shown to be inferior to the
new USIMD is a material fact that must be disclosed.
Failure to do so subjects the surgeon to potential liability
for failure to provide informed consent.
Finally, informed consent almost always requires
the surgeon disclose risks of death or serious injury. 122
Where a USIMD has a known learning curve with a risk of
death or serious injury, the physician has a duty to
disclose those risks. If the information available to the
physician is controversial, then the surgeon may simply
disclose the facts of the information available and leave
the decision to the patient. 123

C. Standard of Care
Whether the jurisdiction requires surgeons to follow
the reasonable patient standard or the reasonable doctor
standard, disclosure of the learning curve risks of the

121. Bang, 88 N.W.2d at 190.
122. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787-88; Ray, 259 P.3d at 584; Mitchell v.
Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (noting the physician must warn of “possible serious
collateral hazards”).
123. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87.
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USIMD is required. 124 The states are evenly divided on
which standard is applied. 125
In states that use the reasonable patient standard,
the doctor breaches his or her duty of informed consent
where a reasonably prudent patient with the plaintiff’s
characteristics would have declined the operation with the
USIMD if he or she had been properly informed. 126
Because a reasonably prudent patient would want to be
informed of the learning curve and its risks as well as
reasonable alternative methods of treatment (e.g., the
established device), a surgeon who has failed to disclose
risks and alternatives can be found to have breached his
or her duty. A few jurisdictions replace the reasonably
prudent patient (objective standard) with the particular
plaintiff (subjective standard) 127 so that the duty is to
disclose information that the particular plaintiff would
consider important. In those jurisdictions, the plaintiff can
easily claim that he or she would have wanted to know
about the learning curve and would have chosen the safer
alternative if given the choice.
A reasonably prudent patient would want to know of
an increased risk of death or serious injury associated with
a learning curve. Likewise, if the doctor is on the learning
curve because of limited experience with a new USIMD, a
reasonable patient would probably want to know that
information. In addition, if there are less risky alternatives,
the reasonable patient would likely want to know of the
alternative and participate in any decision to accept the
added risk of a USIMD. All of those factors are material to
the patient’s ability to make a rational decision in giving
informed consent.
In jurisdictions where the reasonable physician
standard is used, the doctor has a duty to disclose “any
known risks of death or serious bodily injury” 128 and “such
124. See Healey & Samanta, supra note 118, at 256.
125. FURROW ET AL., supra note 110, at 195.
126. Giles v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 5 So. 3d 533, 553-54 (Ala.
2008); Ex parte Mendel, 942 So. 2d 829, 837 (Ala. 2006); Harrold v. Artwohl, 132
P.3d 276, 280 (Alaska 2006).
127. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Okla. 1979).
128. Jones v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 894, 901 (N.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d,
127 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that physician has a duty to disclose known
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additional [risks] as a skilled practitioner of good standing
would provide under similar circumstances.” 129
The
applicable community standard is a question of fact for the
jury 130 and expert testimony is required to establish the
standard of care. 131 In these jurisdictions, some doctors
doubtless disclose learning curve risks, including the risks
and benefits of the new USIMD versus the established
device as well as the specific doctor’s personal experience
and preferences. 132 Therefore, it may be possible to show
that the standard of care is to disclose that information via
expert testimony.
However, even if the learning curve is not routinely
disclosed by the surgeons in a reasonable doctor
jurisdiction, the court can still adopt the rule that disclosure
of the learning curve is the standard of care. 133 Judge
Learned Hand pointed out that “[w]hat usually is done may
be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to
be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence.” 134
Hand notes that “a whole calling may have unduly lagged”
the adoption of “reasonable prudence,” and in those
cases, “[c]ourts must . . . say what is required.” 135 Hand
goes on to say that “there are precautions so imperative
that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission.” 136

risks of death or serious bodily injury to the patient and to explain the
complications that might occur); see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10-11 (Cal.
1972).
129. Jones, 933 F. Supp. at 901-02.
130. Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 476, 479, 597 S.W.2d 88, 90 (1980); Stauffer
v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. App. 1971).
131. Mather v. Griffin Hosp., 540 A.2d 666, 670 (Conn. 1988).
132. See Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Advisory Opinion on the Code of
Ethics: Learning New Techniques Following Residency (Oct. 10, 2014),
http://www.aao.org/ethics-detail/advisory-opinion—learning-new-techniquesfollowin#related-comments.
133. See Anna C. Mastroianni, Liability, Regulation and Policy in Surgical
Innovation: The Cutting Edge of Research and Therapy, 16 HEALTH MATRIX J. L.
MED. 351, 427-28 (2006).
134. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
135. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
136. Id.
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William L. Prosser 137 explained that “in negligence
cases, the duty is . . . to conform to the legal standard of
reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.”138
The doctor must satisfy this duty by informing the patient
of the risk of the learning curve especially where those
risks are material to the patient’s decision, are
unnecessary due to an alternative treatment option, or are
risks of serious injury or death. 139 Disclosure of the
material facts necessary to allow the patient to make
rational decisions is such a basic right that it might be time
for courts to overrule the profession in any jurisdiction
where the disclosure of learning curves is not standard
practice.

D. Affordable Care Act: “Preference Sensitive Care”
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides evidence
of changing professional standards of care for informed
consent with regard to “preference sensitive care” 140 that
may be used as evidence in matters of state informed
consent law. Preference sensitive care is defined the
following way:
[M]edical care for which the clinical evidence does
not clearly support one treatment option such that
the appropriate course of treatment depends on the
values . . . and preferences of the patient . . .
regarding the benefits, harms and scientific
evidence for each treatment option, the use of such
care should depend on the informed patient choice
among clinically appropriate treatment options. 141

For USIMDs with learning curves, the device
manufacturers have foregone safety and effectiveness
testing, and thus, conceivably do not have “clinical
137. William L. Prosser, a former dean of the University of California Law
School at Berkeley, was widely considered “a great Master at Torts.” Lawrence H.
Eldredge, William Lloyd Prosser, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1245, 1245, 1247 (1972).
138. KEETON ET AL., supra note 103.
139. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
140. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 936, 42 U.S.C. § 299b36(b)(2), (d)(1)(A) (2012).
141. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 936, 42 U.S.C. § 299b36(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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evidence” to “clearly support” or favor the use of the
USIMD over an established device. 142 In those instances,
the ACA appears to advocate allowing the patient to hear
about “each treatment option” and use his or her own
“values and preferences” in the decision making
process. 143 This cannot be done if the physician fails to
inform the patient of the learning curve, the risks of the
USIMD, and the presence of a safe alternative device.

IV. OVERARCHING PUBLIC POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
Innovation is an important part of the advancement
of medical science; 144 however, newness is not the same
as innovation. An advancement should move the field
Arguably,
forward, not backwards or sideways. 145
surgeons’ adoption of the Nail did not advance the field of
orthopedic treatment of hip fractures and may have
actually set it back. This shift from the Screw to the Nail
resulted in many patients experiencing unnecessary
disability and probably some deaths. 146 Today, there is
still no evidence the Nail is better than the Screw it
replaced. That is not advancement—that is marketing.
Where the USIMD is more profitable than the established
device, it may also be profiteering at the expense of the
harmed patient. Therefore, the court system should
reward the patients who suffered for these innovations by
recognizing the failures of the device manufacturers and
the surgeons involved.
Understanding why surgeons adopt ineffective,
harmful technology may help provide a solution to the
problem. A former president of the American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons (the “world’s largest medical
association of musculoskeletal specialists” now with over
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 193 (“The committee believes that given
the broad interpretation of the term it should define innovation not simply as a
change but as a favorable change in the context of public health . . . . The
committee defined innovation broadly as improving the quality of, efficiency of, or
access to health care.”).
145. Id.
146. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 704-05.
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39,000 members worldwide) 147 described medicine as a
“marketing arm of industry.” 148 Similarly, a prominent
medical ethicist noted that “there is no necessary
correlation between the kind of innovation generated by
the market and the kind of technology needed to improve
overall health.”149
The cost of USIMDs with learning curves is
substantial. For example, hip fractures of the type treated
with the Nail and the Screw are a “major source of
morbidity and financial burden” in the United States
accounting for seven percent of osteoporotic fractures and
approximately $6 billion annually. 150 According to a 2008
study, government insurers like Medicare spent an
average of $950 more per surgery on the Nail than the
Screw during the first year after implantation. 151 If the Nail
were used in approximately 150,000 intertrochanteric hip
fractures in the U.S. each year, the extra cost would have
been around 142.5 million (i.e., 150,000 x $950) per year
for this single device. 152 By 2008 when this study was
published, the learning curve phenomenon with the Nail
was largely complete. 153 These numbers could very well
underestimate the actual cost of adopting the Nail
considering that from 1999 through 2004 the complication
rate for Nail-related bone fracture alone was between
300% and 800% that of the Screw. 154 If only a small
percentage of the 48,000 USIMDs cleared from 1996
through 2009 had the same financial impact as the Nail
adoption, then the costs to the U.S. healthcare system
would be staggering. 155

147. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Background, AMERICAN
ACADEMY
OF
ORTHOPAEDIC
SURGEONS,
http://www.aaos.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=1604.
148. AUGUSTO SARMIENTO, BARE BONES: A SURGEON’S TALE: THE PRICE OF
SUCCESS IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 284 (2003).
149. DANIEL CALLAHAN, FALSE HOPES: WHY AMERICA’S QUEST FOR PERFECT
HEALTH IS A RECIPE FOR FAILURE 225 (1998).
150. Swart et al., supra note 24, at 1612.
151. Aros et al., supra note 3, at 2831.
152. See id.; see also Swart et al., supra note 24, at 1612.
153. See Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 12, at 704 (Figure 4-A).
154. See id. at 703-04.
155. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 136.
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Regulation of high-risk devices released through
pathways intended for lower risk devices is a great
challenge. 156 In 2010, there was public outcry over
several specific devices and the methods through which
the FDA cleared them. 157 Calls for change to the FDA’s
approval process for implantable medical devices have
been emphatic and have come from highly respected
authorities, yet Congress has still failed to act. 158 In 2011,
the FDA asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to review
the 510(k) clearance process and make recommendations
to protect the health of the public while protecting the
legitimate interests of industry. 159 The IOM concluded that
the 510(k) process was fatally “flawed” 160 because it
generally does not evaluate safety and efficacy and
cannot be transformed into such process. 161 The IOM
noted that the assessment utilized (“substantial
equivalence”) does not provide a “reasonable assurance
of safety and efficacy” as required by statute for some of
the devices at issue (Class III). 162 The IOM Committee
156. Daniel B. Kramer et al., Regulation of Medical Devices in the United
States and European Union, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 848, 852 (2012).
157. Gardiner Harris, U.S. Inaction Lets Look-Alike Tubes Kill Patients, N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
20,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/21/health/policy/21tubes.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0 [https://perma.cc/Q3ZX-XLCU] (noting resistance from the medical device
industry and an approval process that discourages safety-related changes as
factors in deaths related to some tubing connections); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A.
Vows to Revoke Approval of Device, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/health/policy/15fda.html
[https://perma.cc/3CSU-FJAS] (noting politics trumped science in approval of knee
patch); Barry Meier, The Implants Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/business/17hip.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/5BHK-8QFZ] (recognizing potential problems with several
devices that had been cleared through the 510(k) process, including an artificial
hip); Alicia Mundy & Jared A. Favole, F.D.A. Rips Approval of Medical Device,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
25,
2009,
12:01
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125382260933538517
[https://perma.cc/FM6ZBXVB] (noting Congressional pressure damaged the integrity of the F.D.A.’s
approval process).
158. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 n.5 (noting that concern is being
raised about the 510(k) process not fostering innovation nor making safe and
effective devices available to patients citing letters from House Representatives).
159. IOM REPORT, supra note 1, at xi.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id.
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recommended that the FDA scrap the current system and
replace it with an “integrated premarket and postmarket
regulatory framework that effectively provides a
reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness
throughout the device life cycle.” 163 Obviously, the lifecycle would include the learning curve period. However,
there are no signs that such changes are forthcoming, and
implant manufacturers continue to argue for more lenient
standards. 164
This leaves the court system as the patient’s best
protector against unreasonable harm, or death, at the
hands of medical device manufacturers and overly-eager,
early-adapter surgeons who promote USIMDs. Where it
can be proven a device has a learning curve by showing
that the surgeon has not done many procedures with the
device, and the literature or experts agree that a learning
curve is expected, the patient injured during the learning
curve has a valid argument for defective design. When
the patient is uninformed, he or she may also have claims
for failure to warn (if the manufacturer did not inform the
surgeon) or for lack of informed consent against the
doctor.

V. CONCLUSION
The presence of a learning curve with significant
patient injuries for a USIMD is prima facie evidence of
defective design, and unless the device manufacturer can
demonstrate a benefit to offset the risk, the patient should
prevail in a design defect case where the patient was
harmed by the device implanted by a surgeon on the
learning curve. Risk-utility balancing in close cases
should be left to the trier of fact. When the patient is not
warned about the presence of the learning curve with a
USIMD, the patient may have a claim against the
manufacturer for failure to warn if the learned intermediary
was not properly informed of the risk, or against the
163. Id. at 8.
164. Dangerous Medical Implants and Devices: Most Medical Implants Have
Never Been Tested for Safety, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 2012),
http://consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/04/cr-investigates-dangerousmedical-devices/index.htm [https://perma.cc/P7PH-MBFJ].
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physician for lack of informed consent if the surgeon fails
to notify the patient of the risks of the learning curve. As it
is, there are overarching public policy concerns that
support the courts taking up this issue to protect the
interests of patients and of society as a whole.

